Re-election of Local Authorities: An Analysis of Its Influence on District Well-being Indicators During the 2011–2014 Municipal Term

The electoral system in effect in Peru until 2014 allowed for the indefinite reelection of subnational officials. However, in 2015, a law was enacted that prohibited the immediate reelection of regional and local officials. Motivated by this development, the purpose of this study is to evaluate the effect of reelection on the performance of local officials in Peru. Specifically, the hypothesis proposed is that reelection would have a positive impact on the performance of local officials. The theoretical channel formulated for this approach is based on the idea that greater experience in office would lead to greater competence on the part of the mayor. This focus on competence is present in the political economy literature but has been little studied empirically. The empirical strategy to test the hypothesis was to apply a discontinuous regression methodology, using mayors who were either reelected or narrowly defeated. To measure the performance of local authorities, variables related to the main areas of investment by district mayors were used: educational outcomes, the prevalence of acute diarrheal diseases, and economic activity. The main results suggest that there are no significant differences in performance between districts with reelected mayors and those with first-term mayors. These findings are not uniform when it comes to educational variables, as there are positive but temporary effects in certain cases. The paper outlines some possible explanations and interpretations of these findings.